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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF TRADE IN DEMAND FOR SKILL IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
Mar´ıa Jose´ Orraca Corona
Ana Cecilia Fieler
This dissertation explores the effect of trade in demand for skill in an unskilled labor-
abundant country. I use the case of Mexico to document that exporters are on average
more skill-intensive than non exporters, yet conditional on exporting skill intensity is neg-
atively correlated with export sales. I build a model to explain these two observations
simultaneously and estimate it for two Mexican manufacturing industries in 2003. A coun-
terfactual analysis illustrates that when trade costs decrease, resources are reallocated to
the most skilled-intensive firms within industries but toward the unskilled-intensive tasks
within industries. When trade costs are high, the first effect dominates and skill premium
increases. When trade costs are sufficiently low, comparative advantage in unskilled inten-
sive activities dominates and skill premium decreases. This pattern matches the observed
behavior of skill premium in Mexican manufacturing industry following trade liberalization
reforms.
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CHAPTER 1 : Trade and Demand for Skill in Emerging Economies: Comparative
or Competitive Advantage?
1.1. Introduction
A large strand of literature has focused on understanding how trade affects the demand for
skill in emerging economies. Neoclassical trade theory predicts that resources are reallocated
towards the industries where the country has a comparative advantage (Stolper-Samuelson
result). If emerging economies are abundant in unskilled labor (relative to their industri-
alized trading partners), this theory predicts that unskilled-intensive industries grow with
trade liberalization.1 New trade literature on the other hand predicts that because pro-
ductivity is skill-biased, trade increases demand for skill in all countries because resources
are reallocated to most productive firms within industries, which that are also the most
skill-intensive industries.2 Trade is predicted to increase demand for skill through other
mechanisms like quality and technology upgrading and technological spillovers.3
The two channels highlighted above−comparative and competitive advantage− have been
put together by Bernard et al. (2007b). These authors link firm heterogeneity with relative
factor abundance and conclude that trade liberalization amplifies productivity gains from
trade in the comparative advantage industry. Since industrialized countries have compar-
ative advantage in skill-intensive industries, both channels act in the same direction and
their results are consistent with predictions of both strands of literature. However, the
conclusions are inconsistent for emerging economies because the advantage sector in these
countries tends to be low-skill intensive. Therefore, the effect of competitive advantage of
most productive firms in an industry is dampened.
1 See Romalis (2004); Gonzaga et al. (2006); Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015).
2 See Attanasio et al. (2004); Caselli (2014); Burstein and Vogel (2017) for arguments of why more
productive firms are more skill-intensive.
3 See Verhoogen (2008); Lileeva and Trefler (2010); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012); Eslava et al. (2015)
for quality upgrading, Yeaple (2005); Bustos (2011) for technology upgrading, and Grossman and Helpman
(1991) for spillovers. See also Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a review
about how trade has increased skill premium across emerging economies.
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I use the case of Mexico as an example of an emerging economy to show that both channels
are operating. Data from the Mexican Economic Census shows that within industries, firms
that export have on average larger domestic sales and larger value added per worker than do
non-exporters (Fact 1). Exporters are more skill-intensive compared to non-exporters (Fact
2). The correlation between value added per worker and skill-intensity of firms is positive
(Fact 3); and conditional on exporting, export intensity is negatively correlated with skill
intensity even after controlling for other characteristics of the firm (Fact 4).4
Literature on firm heterogeneity with skill-biased productivity may account for facts 1-3 if
trade is costly. However, since this literature considers a single industry, it cannot explain
fact 4. Instead, Bernard et al. (2007b)’s framework may explain facts 1 and 4 if applied
to a relatively unskilled-abundant country. However, it still cannot explain facts 2 and 3
because their model does not incorporate any mechanism that makes the most productive
firms in an industry more skill intensive. In other words, their framework considers the
choice of factor intensity as constant for every firm in the industry.
In this paper I address this inconsistency through a model that may explain the four facts
above. The model consists of a small open economy where firms are heterogeneous in
productivity and productivity is skilled biased (as in Burstein and Vogel (2017)).5 There
are two industries that differ from each other because one of them is export-oriented (faces
relatively high exogenous foreign demand) and the other is domestic-oriented. There are
two factors of production, skilled and unskilled workers, and two tasks within each industry
which differ in skill-intensity. Trade is costly so only the most productive firms export.
There is a fixed cost of producing the skill-intensive task so there is also selection into
producing this task.
4 Processing firms (maquiladoras) are excluded from the sample for all results presented in this paper.
Skill intensity is defined as the fraction of payments to non-production workers, but the observations are
consistent for other measures of skill ( s
u
, average wage, average years of education of workers, fraction of
workers with high school, fraction of workers with university). Export-intensity is defined as Exports
Total sales
.
5 Burstein and Vogel (2017) explore the effects of trade on skill premium by exploring the interaction of
comparative advantage and firm productivity in a framework similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s. This
paper instead embeds these mechanisms in a Melitz-style framework.
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This model summarizes the channels through which two opposing forces − comparative and
competitive advantage − interact in equilibrium to explain the four facts described above.
In the model, the fraction of skilled workers differs between firms within the same indus-
try because more productive firms choose a larger fraction of skilled labor for each task,
and because the skill-intensive tasks represent a larger fraction of their total production.
Additionally, selection into exporting makes exporters more skill-intensive. In a relatively
unskilled-abundant country that has comparative advantage in unskilled-intensive tasks,
these tasks face a relatively larger exogenous foreign demand. Therefore, firms that spe-
cialize on the unskilled-intensive tasks, which correspond to the least productive exporters,
have larger export shares.
This framework is useful to study the effect of trade in demand for skilled labor because
it incorporates several mechanisms. The first refers to resources being reallocated to the
export-oriented industry that is also more skill-intensive (both in the model and in the
data). The second is comparative advantage: foreign sales of unskilled-intensive tasks in the
relatively export oriented industries are disproportionately affected. The third is skill-biased
productivity that has two effects. Following trade liberalization, more productive and skill-
intensive firms grow more. Additionally, skill-bias magnifies productivity advantage in skill-
intensive tasks, so trade will disproportionately benefit the relatively low productivity-low
skilled exporters that specialize in the unskilled-intensive task. The fourth is the extensive
margin of producing skill-intensive tasks. Since trade provides access to an additional
market, the fraction of firms that may produce the costly skill-intensive task increases.
This increases average skill-intensity in the industry because more firms use a more skill-
intensive technology, but decreases average skill-intensity of firms performing skill-intensive
tasks.
I structurally estimate the model to study how these mechanisms interact. The estimation
is done for two manufacturing industries in Mexico that differ in their exporting patterns
and skill intensity: the transportation equipment industry and the metal products industry.
3
I use the estimated model to understand the effects of changes in trade costs on demand for
skill. The main result is that when trade costs are high enough, a decrease in trade costs
increases the skill premium because the skill-biased productivity mechanism dominates.
However, as trade costs decrease, the comparative advantage effect dominates and skill
premium falls. This behavior is consistent with the observed evolution of skill premium in
Mexican manufacturing following the liberalization reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s.6
Understanding the interaction of comparative and competitive advantages in an unskilled-
abundant country has long been a topic of interest for economists. The framework in this
paper allows to study reallocations simultaneously across industries, across tasks within
industries, and across firms. Results highlight that as exporting becomes more attractive,
firms in an unskilled labor abundant country face a disproportional increase in demand
for unskilled-intensive tasks. This may dampen productivity gains from trade because
on one hand it induces all firms to specialize in these tasks and on the other hand it
disproportionately affects relatively more unproductive exporters. These incentives might
discourage skill accumulation across industries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 shows empirical evidence of the
mechanisms detailed above for the case of Mexico. Section 1.3 presents the model and
discusses the characteristics of equilibrium. Section 1.4 informs the model with data from
Mexican manufacturing sector, and Section 1.5 studies the effect of trade on demand for
skill as informed by the model. Section 1.6 concludes.
6 Trade liberalization reforms in Mexico can be traced back to 1986 when Mexico joined the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and agreed to set a 50% ceiling on tariffs. There were subsequent
waves of tariff reductions, and some changes took some time to be fully implemented. Since then, apart
from joining NAFTA, Mexico joined OECD, WTO and has signed several free trade agreements.
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1.2. Empirical Evidence
This section presents evidence of the exporting patterns of manufacturing firms in Mexico
as an example of an emerging economy. I show that comparative and competitive advantage
are operating in the sector. Concretely, I present evidence that exporters are larger, more
productive and more capital and skill-intensive than non exporters, but conditional on being
an exporter, it is the least skill-intensive firms that have larger export shares. Additionally,
skill-intensity is positively correlated to value added per worker and sales in the domestic
market. This is also true for exporting firms. However, foreign sales are negatively correlated
with skill-intensity, leading to the negative relationship observed between export shares and
skill. I also argue that the link between skill and firm size is driven by the interaction of a
positive productivity effect and a negative comparative advantage effect.
Mexico is an appropriate country to study these mechanisms because exports are an im-
portant component of GDP, exports consist mainly of manufacturing goods, and more than
80% of manufacturing exports of the country go to the United States. Therefore, Mexico
is arguably abundant in unskilled labor relative to its main trading partner.7.
1.2.1. Data
I use confidential firm level data for manufacturing sector from the Mexican Economic Cen-
sus. The advantage of this database is that it includes all establishments that operate in
the year of the census. The disadvantage is that there is no information on the educa-
tion of workers, so the measure of skill used is the fraction of payments to white collar
workers. Data from the National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology and Training
(ENESTyC) is used to show that the evidence presented is robust to more accurate mea-
sures of skill. I restrict the sample to non-processing (non maquiladora) firms that reported
7 In 2004 Mexican exports represented 20% of GDP, 84% of total exports were from the manufacturing
sector, and 88.6% of non-oil exports went to the United States. In the same year, 36.1% of the popu-
lation older than 25 in United States had finished post-secondary education; the fraction in Mexico was
22.4% (World Development Indicators, World Bank). Similarly, according to BLS the fraction of non-
production workers to production workers in the manufacturing sector in United States in 2003 was 0.416
(https:factfinder.census.gov), while the number is 0.216 for Mexico (Economic Census 2004, INEGI).
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positive production in the year of the survey. More details about the data can be found in
the Data Appendix. The results in this section should be interpreted only as correlations,
not as evidence of a causal relationship between the variables.
1.2.2. Evidence in Mexican Manufacturing Sector
Exporters’ Advantage
Evidence in the cross section of Mexican firms is consistent with the predictions of Melitz
(2003) and with empirical literature that has documented that exporters are larger and more
productive (Bernard et al. (2007a); Bernard et al. (2003)). Concretely, Mexican exporters
have systematically larger employment and total sales, higher value added per worker, pay
higher wages, and are more capital and skill intensive.8 This is still true after controlling
for industry and foreign capital participation (see Tables 6 and 7).
Productivity and Skill-intensity
Columns 1-2 in Table 7 show that skill intensity is positively correlated with value added
per worker. From the lens of this paper, this observation is interpreted as evidence that
productivity is skill-biased.
Skill Intensity, Export Participation and Export Share
There is a positive correlation between skill-intensity and export participation both between
and within industries. Figure 8 shows that industries with higher export participation are
also more skill-intensive on average.9 Columns 3-4 in Table 7 show that within industries,
8 Skill intensity is measured as the fraction of payments to non-production (white collar) workers. Capital
intensity is measured as capital stock per worker.
9 This explains why firms in industries like cars, machinery, and computers are more likely to export.
A plausible explanation for this trend is that preferences are non-homothetic so demand in higher income
countries is biased towards higher skilled industries. If more skill-intensive goods are more expensive, another
explanation is that trade costs represent a lower fraction of the value of goods. Therefore, lower production
costs in lower-income countries represent a higher advantage for high-skilled high-value industries. Thirdly,
it is possible that goods produced with higher skill are more difficult to replicate, so have less substitutes
and will be more likely to be traded internationally.
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skill intensity of firms is also positively correlated with the probability of exporting (exten-
sive margin). This observation is consistent with previous literature (Burstein and Vogel
(2017)).
Conditional on exporting, skill-intensity is negatively correlated with export share (intensive
margin). Columns 5-6 in Table 7 show that the negative relationship of skill and export
intensity is large, significant, and robust to firm characteristics and industry fixed-effects.
Additionally, although exporters are more productive and larger compared to non-exporters,
more productive exporters are not more export intensive on average.10 These patterns are
robust to different measures of skill (Table 8 and Figure 10).
The contrast between the extensive and intensive margin of exporting is illustrated in Figure
9. The figure shows that the lowest skill deciles of firms have on average lower export
participation, but the lowest skill deciles of exporters have higher export shares.
The evidence presented above reflects that firms that participate in international trade
are the most productive and skill-intensive within each industry and that trade happens
mainly in skill-intensive industries. However, conditional on exporting, the firms with lower
skill intensity have higher export intensity. I interpret this as evidence that the Mexican
exporting sector has specialized in the relatively low-skill tasks within industries that are
export-oriented. I argue that this pattern of specialization has occurred because Mexico
has comparative advantage in these activities.
Skill-Intensity and Firm Size
Figure 11 illustrates exporters’ productivity advantage clearly: exporters are larger and
more productive than non exporters. In a plot of log employment versus value added per
worker, exporters are concentrated on the top right corner of the figure. These relations
are significant and robust to other controls, and exist both in the domestic and foreign
10 Recent literature has suggested that the role of productivity as the determinant of firm size has been
overstated. Holmes and Stevens (2014) argue that size is determined by the nature of goods; Armenter and
Koren (2015) instead emphasize exporting costs are firm-specific.
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market (Table 9). If domestic and foreign sales are determined only by productivity and
under the assumption that skill-intensity is correlated with productivity, then the relation
between skill-intensity and size should be similar. However, Figure 12 shows a different
story: average firm size is increasing in average skill intensity for domestic firms, but the
relationship between skill-intensity and size is flat for exporters.11 Table 9 shows that the
unconditional correlation between skill intensity and sales of exporters in the national and
foreign market is positive and significant (panel C of Table 9). However, controlling for value
added per worker the correlation between skill intensity and domestic sales remains positive
and significant, but the correlation between skill intensity and foreign sales becomes negative
and significant. In consequence, the correlation between skill and size is not statistically
different from zero. This explains the positive relationship between skill intensity and size
for domestic firms and the flat relationship for exporters that is observed in Figure 12.
I interpret the positive coefficient of skill and domestic sales as driven by the positive
correlation between skill and productivity. Since firms in every regression in panel C of
Table 9 are the same, to make sense of a positive correlation of skill intensity and domestic
sales but a negative correlation with exports, there should be a mechanism, correlated
with skill-intensity, that is acting only for foreign sales. I propose that this mechanism is
comparative advantage.
Given the evidence in this section, the relationship between skill intensity and size of Mexi-
can manufacturing firms can be explained by the interaction between two competing forces:
a positive productivity effect and a negative comparative advantage effect. The former
corresponds to the standard Melitz productivity effect, which implies that more productive
firms are larger. If skill intensity is positively correlated with productivity, then more skill-
intensive firms are also larger. The second mechanism is negative for emerging economies
that have comparative advantage in unskilled-intensive activities. Only the first effect exists
for domestic firms so the relationship between skill intensity and size is positive. However,
11 This relationship is robust to measuring skill intensity as the fraction of payments to non-production
workers, or by average labor payments.
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the second mechanism counteracts productivity as a determinant of firm size of exporters,
flattening the relation. While productivity drives domestic sales and the probability of
exporting, comparative advantage drives export intensity conditional on being an exporter.
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1.3. Model
In this section I present a model that incorporates the mechanisms documented above and
explain how these channels operate in the model.
1.3.1. Setup
Consider a small open economy with two factors of production, skilled and unskilled workers
(s and u), and k = 1, ...,K industries. In each industry there are two tasks, {kl, kh}.
Production of task kh requires a more skill-intensive technology than task kl. Firms are
heterogeneous in idiosyncratic productivity and industry where they operate. Each firm
is born in an industry able to perform task kl. It may pay a fixed cost to have access to
a skill-intensive technology and perform task kh. If it does so, the firm performs the two
tasks simultaneously. There is a continuum of firms in each industry, and monopolistic
competition in the production of each task. There is a mass of entrepreneurs that draw
a productivity and decide whether to produce or not. Firms enter and exit endogenously
and there is no exogenous exit. The factors of production move freely between firms and
industries, but cannot leave the country. The domestic economy is relatively abundant in
unskilled labor, and may access the foreign market with exogenous demand for exports and
price of imports.12 World variables will be denoted by an asterisk and are exogenous. In
the following, I denote domestic prices, quantities, revenues and profits with a superscript
d, and those for exports with a superscript x.
Consumption: Representative consumers maximize utility that depends on consumption
of a CES aggregate of differentiated varieties of each task kj from K industries. The set of
available varieties of task kj , is denoted by Ωkj . Consumers choose quantities {q(ω)}ω∈Ωkj
12 Under the assumption of a small open economy, aggregate variables in the world (zero-productivity
cutoffs, mass of firms, total expenditure and price index) are unaffected by the domestic economy.
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to maximize utility function:
U =
∏
k={1,...K} j∈{l,h}
(
Qkj
)αkj
where Qkj is a consumption index with price index Pkj . If σ =
1
1−ρ > 1 is the constant
elasticity of substitution across varieties, the aggregate of consumption and price index are
given by
Qkj =
[∫
ω∈Ωkj
q(ω)ρ∂ω
] 1
ρ
, P ckj =
[∫
ω∈Ωkj
p(ω)1−σ∂ω
] 1
1−σ
(1.1)
Production: Heterogeneous firms produce differentiated varieties of tasks (ω) within in-
dustries. Skill and productivity complementarity is introduced as in Burstein and Vogel
(2017). If a firm uses s skilled workers and u unskilled workers to produce task kj , its
output is given by
y(βkj , ϕ) = ϕ
[
β
1
η
kj
(ϕςs)
η−1
η + (1− βkj )
1
η u
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(1.2)
where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and
ς controls the skill bias of productivity. Tasks in each industry differ only in their skill-
intensity parameter. A firm is completely characterized by the industry it operates in and
productivity, so I denote each firm by the pair (k, ϕ).
Labor demand: Given wages to unskilled and skilled workers (wu and ws), the decision
about the fraction of skilled workers used for each task is static and given by:
s(βkj , ϕ)
u(βkj , ϕ)
=
βkj
1− βkj
(
wu
ws
)η
ϕς(η−1) (1.3)
Using (1.2) and (1.3), the marginal cost of performing task kj for a firm with productivity
11
ϕ is :
c(βkj , ϕ) =
1
ϕ
(
βkj
(
ϕ−ςws
)1−η
+ (1− βkj )wu1−η
) 1
1−η
(1.4)
1.3.2. Equilibrium in a small open economy with costly trade
Prices: Profit maximization implies a constant markup over marginal cost in each task,
and each market, so domestic price is:
pd(βkj , ϕ) =
c(βkj , ϕ)
ρ
(1.5)
Firms face iceberg variable trade costs τkj > 1 to sell in foreign market. Therefore, export
price of task (βkj , ϕ) is
px(βkj , ϕ) =
τkjc(βkj , ϕ)
ρ
(1.6)
Domestic sales: R is total revenue in the economy, so quantity demanded and revenue
for task kj in the domestic market is:
qd(βkj , ϕ) =
αkjRP
σ−1
k
pd(βkj , ϕ)
σ
rd(βkj , ϕ) = αkjR
(
ρPkj
c(βkj , ϕ)
)σ−1
(1.7)
Foreign sales : Task kj faces exogenous foreign demand
qx(βkj , ϕ) = p(βkj , ϕ)
−σD∗kj (1.8)
Therefore, exports are:
rx(βkj , ϕ) = D
∗
kj
(
ρ
τkc(βkj , ϕ)
)σ−1
(1.9)
Cutoffs to enter, export, and produce skill-intensive task: There is an exogenous
12
mass of entrants each period.13 Each entering firm draws a productivity ϕ from a distribu-
tion with density gk(ϕ) and cumulative distribution Gk(ϕ). Selling domestically incurs in
fixed costs of fdk > 0 per period, paid using a separate factor of production whose supply is
perfectly elastic.14 Paying this cost allows the firm to perform task kl using technology βkl .
Selling in the foreign market incurs in fixed costs fxk per period, paid using the separate
factor of production. A firm in industry k may additionally pay fixed cost fhk to perform
task kh using technology βkh > βkl .
Zero profits for the marginal firm in the domestic market pins down the cutoff productivity
to produce in the market, ϕlk.
fdk =
rd(βkl , ϕ
l
k)
σ
(1.10)
The cutoffs to export and perform task kh are denoted ϕ
x
k and ϕ
h
k respectively. Zero profits
for the marginal firm in the foreign market and that produces the skill-intensive task pin
down cutoff productivities. These are defined as follows:

if ϕhk < ϕ
x
k
rd(βkh ,ϕ
h
k)
σ = f
h
k and
rx(βkl ,ϕ
x
k)+r
x(βkh ,ϕ
x
k)
σ = f
x
k
if ϕhk > ϕ
x
k
rx(βkl ,ϕ
x
k)
σ = f
x
k and
rd(βkh ,ϕ
h
k)+r
x(βkh ,ϕ
h
k)
σ = f
h
k
if ϕhk = ϕ
x
k
rd(βkh ,ϕ
h
k)+r
x(βkl ,ϕ
h
k)+r
x(βkh ,ϕ
h
k)
σ = f
x
k + f
h
k
(1.11)
This determines the mass of domestic varieties (N lk) whre 1 − Gk(ϕlk) =
N lk
Mk
, the mass
13 No free entry so there are profits in equilibrium. See Appendix A for a definition of equilibrium with
free entry, and for an analysis of the effects of trade. The conclusions are consistent with the results of this
version of the model that are presented in the next section.
14 This is done following Eslava et al. (2015), and this way the skill intensity of the firm is given by s
s+u
and the fixed costs do not affect this ratio.
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of exporting firms (Nxk ) where 1 − Gk(ϕxk) =
Nxk
Mk
, and the mass of firms performing skill-
intensive task (Nhk ) where 1−Gk(ϕhk) =
Nhk
Mk
.
Define
Il =
0 if ϕ < ϕ
l
k
1 ϕ ≥ ϕlk
Ixl =
0 if ϕ < ϕ
x
k
1 ϕ ≥ ϕxk
Ih =
0 if ϕ < ϕ
h
k
1 ϕ ≥ ϕhk
Ixh =
0 if ϕ < max{ϕ
h
k , ϕ
x
k}
1 ϕ ≥ max{ϕhk , ϕxk}
Then, total revenue of firm (k, ϕ) is:
r(k, ϕ) =
[
αklR
(
ρPkl
c(βkl , ϕ)
)σ−1]
Il +
[
αkhR
(
ρPkh
c(βkh , ϕ)
)σ−1]
Ih
+
[
D∗kl
(
ρ
τkc(βkl , ϕ)
)σ−1]
Ixl +
[
D∗kh
(
ρ
τkc(βkh , ϕ)
)σ−1]
Ixh
(1.12)
Consumer’s income: The total revenue in both markets for all sectors should equal
consumer’s income (earned as profit, wages, and payments to the additional factor of pro-
duction).
∑
k
Mk
[∫ (
rd(βkl , ϕ)Il + r
x(βkl , ϕ)I
x
l + r
d(βkh , ϕ)Ih + r
x(βkh , ϕ)I
x
h
)
∂Gk(ϕ)
]
= R (1.13)
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The number of skilled and unskilled workers to perform each task kj sold in the domestic and
foreign markets respectively are denoted as sd(βkj , ϕ), u
d(βkj , ϕ), s
x(βkj , ϕ), and u
x(βkj , ϕ).
Using equations (1.2) and (1.3), there is a linear relationship between unskilled labor and
output for market i given by:
qi(βkj , ϕ) = u
i(βkj , ϕ)ϕ
[
(1− βkj )
1
η
(
βkj
1− βkj
ϕς(η−1)
(
wu
ws
)η−1
+ 1
)] η
η−1
(1.14)
Then s(βkj , ϕ) is pinned down by (1.3).
The mass of unskilled and skilled workers are U¯ and S¯. Aggregate labor market clearing
conditions are:
U¯ =
∑
k
Mk
[∫ (
ud(βkl , ϕ)Il + u
x(βkl , ϕ)I
x
l + u
d(βkh , ϕ)Ih + u
x(βkh , ϕ)I
x
h
)
∂Gk(ϕ)
]
(1.15)
S¯ =
∑
k
Mk
[∫ (
sd(βkl , ϕ)Il + s
x(βkl , ϕ)I
x
l + s
d(βkh , ϕ)Ih + s
x(βkh , ϕ)I
x
h
)
∂Gk(ϕ)
]
(1.16)
Aggregation of prices: Domestic price index of task k is:
P 1−σkj = N
d
kj
∫ ∞
ϕdk
pd(βkj , ϕ)
1−σ∂Gk(ϕ) +
(
τkjP
∗
kj
)1−σ
(1.17)
Where P ∗kj is the price index of task kj in the foreign market.
An equilibrium with trade consists on a vector
{pd(βkj , ϕ), px(βkj , ϕ), Pkj , ϕdk, ϕxk, ϕhk , wu, ws, R}
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Given D∗kj ,Mk, τkj and the parameters of the model, the conditions that determine the
equilibrium are, for each task kj , firms’ pricing rules in each market (equations 1.5 and 1.6),
and aggregation of prices (equation 1.17); for each industry k, and zero-profit for marginal
firm in each market (equations 1.10 and 1.11); for the aggregate economy, labor market
clearing (equations 1.15 and 1.16), and consumer’s income aggregation (equation 1.13).
Characteristics of costly trade equilibrium
This framework is suitable to explain the observations in Mexican manufacturing industry
that were documented in section 1.2.
Skill choice of firms: The fraction of skilled labor used in each task is decreasing in the
skill premium (wswu ), increasing in βkl and increasing in ϕ (equation 1.3). Firm skill-intensity
within industries is increasing in ϕ. This is because a more productive firm uses a larger
fraction of skilled labor to perform any task, only the highest productivity firms select into
producing the skill-intensive task, and because the fraction of skill-intensive task in total
production of a firm is increasing in ϕ.15 The parameter ς governs the correlation between
productivity and skill intensity choice. As long as ς(η − 1) > 0, this correlation is positive.
Size, skill-intensity of exporters: Total sales and skill-intensity are strictly increasing
in productivity within an industry (equations 1.3 and 1.7) and employment is increasing in
sales (equation 1.14). Therefore, firms with highest ϕ in an industry are larger and more
skill-intensive. Since there are fixed costs of exporting there is selection of most productive
firms, and exporters in the model are more productive, larger, and more skill-intensive.
Skill-biased productivity and competitive advantage: Skill-biased productivity mag-
nifies productivity advantage in skill-intensive tasks. To illustrate better the role that it
plays, compare a scenario where ς > 0 with one where ς = 0. Define ϕm as the minimum
15 A firm with the same productivity will choose a higher fraction of skilled workers to perform a task kh
because by assumption βkh > βkl . Additionallly, since there is a fixed cost of performing task kh, ϕ
h
k ≥ ϕlk.
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value of gk(ϕ) and suppose that ϕ
ς
m < ws, and ws > wu. These assumptions imply that
if βkh > βkl , then c(βkh , ϕm) > c(βkl , ϕm). If ς = 0, this will be true for any ϕ. However,
if ς > 0 and ϕ is unbounded, there will be some ϕ˚ where
(
ws
ϕ˚ς
)
= 1. For all ϕ > ϕ˚, the
relationship is reversed: If βkh > βkl , then c(βkh , ϕ) < c(βkl , ϕ) ∀ ϕ > ϕ˚. This intuitively
means that while marginal costs are decreasing in productivity in all tasks, they are de-
creasing faster in more skill-intensive tasks. Thus, skill-biased productivity magnifies com-
petitive advantage in skill-intensive activities. In each industry the ratio of skill-intensive
to unskilled-intensive sales is increasing in productivity, so the fraction of the skill-intensive
task in total production of the firm is increasing in ϕ.16
Export-intensity: If firm exports, export share of task kj is given by
Xshare(βkj , ϕ) =
1
1 +
τσ−1αkjRP
σ−1
kj
D∗kj
(1.18)
Export share in each task is independent of idiosyncratic productivity, decreasing in iceberg
trade cost, and increasing in the relative foreign demand. The assumption that home is
relatively abundant in unskilled labor will imply that within industries, relatively unskilled-
intensive tasks have a higher relative demand. Concretely,
τσ−1αkjRP
σ−1
kj
D∗kj
is increasing in
βkj , so that export share of task kj is decreasing in βkj .
Although export share in each task does not depend on productivity, total export share of
firm (k, ϕ) will be affected by the property of skill-biased productivity. As discussed above,
productivity advantage of firms in more skill-intensive tasks is magnified by this property.
Therefore, sales of the skill-intensive task relative to the unskilled-intensive tasks are larger
16 To see that the ratio of skill-intensive to unskilled-intensive sales is increasing in productivity:
r(ϕ, βkh)
r(ϕ, βkl)
=
(
c(βkl , ϕ)
c(βkh , ϕ)
)σ−1 [αkhRPσ−1kh +D∗khτ1−σkh ][
αklRP
σ−1
kl
+D∗klτ
1−σ
kl
]
The terms in the squared brackets are common for all firms within an industry, and skill-biased productivity
implies that relative marginal costs of the unskilled-intensive to the skilled-intensive task are increasing in
ϕ.
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for firms with higher ϕ. Denoting αkjRP
σ−1
kj
= Dkj , export share is given by
Xshare(k, ϕ) =
[
D∗kl
τσ−1kl Dkl
]
+
[(
c(βkl ,ϕ)
c(βkh ,ϕ)
)σ−1 D∗kh
τσ−1kh Dkl
]
1 +
[
Dkh
Dkl
(
c(βkl ,ϕ)
c(βkh ,ϕ)
)σ−1]
+
[
D∗kl
τσ−1kl Dkl
]
+
[(
c(βkl ,ϕ)
c(βkh ,ϕ)
)σ−1 D∗kh
τσ−1kh Dkl
] (1.19)
which is not independent of idiosyncratic productivity. More productive firms produce
relatively more of the high skill-intensive task in both markets.
Effect of Trade on Demand for Skill
A decrease in trade costs affects the demand for skill through several channels. First, trade
will reallocate resources towards the export-oriented industry. Since this industry is also
more skill-intensive, this channel will increase relative demand for skill. I refer to this
as the relative skill between industries mechanism. Second, within industries comparative
advantage increases sales of unskilled task relatively more than those of the skilled task.
This mechanism acts between tasks, so I refer to it as the comparative advantage between
tasks mechanism. Third, skill-biased productivity makes the most productive firms use
relatively more skilled labor to perform each task. Since trade induces a reallocation of
resources towards more productive firms, this mechanism will increase demand for skill.
This is the skill-biased productivity within firms mechanism. The fourth, mechanism is
the interaction between skill-bias and comparative advantage. This mechanism counteracts
the third because comparative advantage disproportionately affects relatively unproductive
exporters that produce both tasks. This is because the share of the unskilled-intensive task
in their total production is larger because competitive advantage of most productive firms
in skill-intensive activities is magnified. Fifth, the extensive margin of skill intensive task
channel refers to the increase in the fraction of firms that perform the skill intensive task.
As trade costs decrease, access to an additional market allows a larger fraction of firms to
pay the fixed cost of producing the skill-intensive task. This will increase average demand
18
for skill at the industry level because more firms use technology βkh > βkl . However,
this mechanism decreases average productivity of the skill intensive task because lower
productivity firms will perform it. Finally, the extensive margin of unskilled-intensive task
will increase demand for skill because trade increases productivity cutoff to produce (induces
creative-destruction). This increases average productivity and skill-intensity of operating
firms. The following table summarizes the mechanisms through which trade affects demand
for skill.
Summary of mechanisms
Mechanism Sign of effect
on skill demand
Relative skill intensity between industries +
Comparative advantage between tasks −
Skill biased productivity within firms +
Interaction of skill bias and comparative advantage −
Extensive margin of skill intensive task +
(average industry skill-intensity)
Extensive margin of skill intensive task −
(average skill-intensity of task kh)
Extensive margin unskilled-intensive task +
The mechanisms described above illustrate the interaction of competing forces in the de-
mand for skill: for the most productive firms in an industry, relative foreign demand for low
skilled task is higher (comparative advantage), but advantage in productivity is stronger
in the high skilled task (competitive advantage). Since different mechanisms act in op-
posite directions, the net effect on relative wage of skilled workers to unskilled workers is
ambiguous.
In the next section I estimate the model to evaluate the effects of trade on the skill premium
and productivity.
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1.4. Estimation
I structurally estimate the model to be able to contrast the effects of trade in an indus-
try that is export-oriented with one that is not, and to study the reallocation of labor
across these industries and across firms within industries when variable trade costs change.
Estimation is done by minimizing the distance between the moments generated in a simu-
lated model and those observed in data. The parameters are estimated simultaneously for
two manufacturing industries: transportation equipment manufacturing and metal prod-
uct manufacturing. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the two industries. I choose the
transportation equipment industry because it includes the automobile industry, which is of
great importance in Mexican exporting activity.17 I consider this industry is the “export-
oriented” industry. Metal products industry was chosen given three considerations. In first
place, there is a big contrast in the importance of international trade in this industry: only
0.46% of firms in this industry are exporters, in contrast to 15.4% in the transportation
equipment industry. This contrast will be useful to understand how trade affects the reallo-
cation of labor between industries with different export orientation. Second, these industries
differ in terms of their skill-intensity: skill-intensity of firms in the metal products industry
is on average 0.076, while the average in transportation equipment industry is 0.224. Third,
metal products represents an important fraction of manufacturing firms, so the conclusions
about what happens in this industry are economically relevant. Together, these two indus-
tries represent 17.1% of establishments and 15.9% of workers in the sample, which consists
of non-processing manufacturing establishments that produced goods in 2003.
1.4.1. Estimation Procedure
Identification
I assume productivity of firms is distributed Pareto with shape parameter a and minimum
parameter b. For identification purposes, all non-exporters in an industry are assumed
17 The automobile industry only represented 27.4% of total Mexican exports in 2003 (BIE, INEGI).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Industry, 2003
Indicator Metal Transportation
Products Equipment
Number of establishments 47,601 1,481
(fraction of total manufacturing)+ 16.6% 0.5%
Total employment in industry 216,237 186,618
Export participation in industry 0.46% 15.4%
Fraction of non-production workers (average) 0.055 0.143
Export share (average) 0.291 0.405
Sales to domestic market (2013 pesos)
Average all establishments 1,920 174,686
standard deviation all establishments 28,162 1,297,566
Average non-exporters 1,260 37,374
Average exporters 144,057 929,300
Skill-intensity
Total 0.076 0.224
Non-exporters 0.072 0.181
Exporters 0.402 0.447
+ Fraction of establishments (employment) in industry out of total sample.
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing
Laboratory. Sample restricted to non-processing establishment with positive production in 2003.
Skill-intensity is measured as the fraction of payments to non-production workers.
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to produce with the same technology, βkl , so that non-exporters do not perform the high
skill task (assumption that ϕxk < ϕ
h
k). This is a reasonable assumption given that when
asked whether the establishment invests in creating new products or not, only 1.2% of non-
exporters in the sample report having invested in the creation of new products, while 54.3%
of exporters report doing so. Given this assumption, average skill-intensity of non-exporters
in data informs βkl . Since I assume that the cutoff to use the high skill-intensity technol-
ogy is above the cutoff to export, I target the observed fraction of exporters with positive
investment in the creation of new products in each industry. This fraction of exporters
are assumed to perform the high skill task, and average skill intensity of exporters informs
βkh . Differences in technologies induce different average skill-intensity, so I infer
D∗kj
αkjRP
σ−1
kj
to match the negative correlation of skill intensity and export share. The correlation be-
tween domestic sales and skill intensity in both industries informs ς. Table 2 presents the
parameters and the moments that help identify them.
I arbitrarily set iceberg trade cost to 1.2 and the minimum of the Pareto distribution to
1.5 so that skilled labor is at least 1.5 times as productive as unskilled. The elasticity of
substitution is taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006) and set to 5, and the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is taken from Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
and set to 1.6. To calculate absorption (αk), I use publicly available data of domestic sales
from Economic Census from INEGI, and the number corresponds to total production in
the industry minus exports plus imports. Non-production workers are taken as proxy of
skilled labor. The ratio of non-production workers to production workers in manufacturing
industry in Mexico is 0.216.18 I normalize wage of unskilled labor and total mass of workers
(S + U) to 1, and this pins down the exogenous mass of entrants in the benchmark.
18 INEGI, Mexican Economic Census, 2004. Manufacturing industry. This number corresponds to all
establishments surveyed.
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Method
Enter iteration with parameters ς, βkl , βkh , ak, αkh , initial D
∗
kl
, D∗kh for k = 1, 2 and with
a guess of participation rate, export participation and fraction of firms that use the high
skill technology in each sector. I simulate an economy consisting on 2 industries each with
50,000 firms that correspond to random draws from a Pareto distribution with minimum
parameter 1.5 and shape ak respectively. For each simulated economy, solve the domestic
equilibrium given {βkl , βkh , η, σ, ς, αkl , αkh , D∗kl , D∗kh , τ} and fraction of firms in each
market for each task. Domestic equilibrium consists on ws, Pk, Y , and equilibrium export
share.19 For each economy and given the rest of parameters, iterate over the pair {D∗kl , D∗kh}
to minimize the difference between the average export share and the correlation between
export share and skill. When convergence is reached, calculate remaining moments. Given
{D∗kl , D∗kh} and equilibrium outcomes, estimated parameters minimize the distance between
the remaining moments in data and the model. Fixed costs, fdk , f
x
k , f
∗
k are chosen so that
marginal firm in each industry and market makes zero profit.
The following table lists the parameters and the moments that will help identify them. All
moments are gotten directly from data except the survival rate that I target to be 90 %.20
1.4.2. Estimation Results
Results are presented in Table 4, and the model fit is presented in Table 5.
Figure 1 shows that the model captures the negative correlation between export share and
19 I solve the domestic equilibrium by 1) finding prices for each industry (fixed point given income and
wages). I adjust the exogenous mass of firms M so that S + U = 1; 2) Given wages, use market clearing
condition to find total revenue; 3) Find ws by using
S
U
= 0.216. Given equilibrium aggregate variables (Pkj ,
R, ws and wu), firms’ choices of each type of labor and total sales in each market are given by the equations
in the model. Additionally, given aggregate variables and exogenous foreign variables, the solution of a
domestic equilibrium gives average export shares per sector.
I do not have data to separately identify P ∗kj , which enters the price index of task kj as a shifter (equation
1.17). Since the effect on price index is proportional to τ , which I assume to be common across tasks, all
prices will change in the same proportion. Only relative prices matter, so I assume that all price indexes are
affected by τ1−σ.
20 For this version of the paper I target a survival rate of 90%, but I plan to experiment with other values
in the future. In particular, I will use data on the probability that the firm does not exit in the first year.
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters
Transportation equipment Metal Products
NAICS 336 NAICS 332
ς 1.138
βl 0.205 0.0997
βh 0.633 0.701
a 8.02 7.99
α2 0.348 0.367
D∗l 0.641 0.083
D∗h 0.356 0.084
fd 0.128 0.033
fx 0.293 0.290
fh 0.433 4.82
Table 5: Model Fit
Transport Equip. Metal Products
NAICS 336 NAICS 332
Data Model Data Model
Skill intensity non exporters 0.181 0.170 0.072 0.084
Skill intensity exporters 0.447 0.320 0.402 0.336
sd sales
average sales 7.43 7.43 14.67 14.67
avg dom sales non exporters
avg dom sales exporters 0.040 0.101 0.009 0.009
Average export share 0.405 0.408 0.291 0.296
Correlation skill, export share † -0.143 -0.143 -0.089 -0.091
Successful entry (target) 90% 91.0% 90% 90%
Export participation 15.4% 15.3% 0.46% 0.46%
Fraction of exporters with high technology 71.5% 70.7% 40.5% 40.2%
Data Model
corr(dom sales, skill intensity) 0.1917 0.316
† Coefficient on skill-intensity (measured as the fraction of payments to non-production workers) in an OLS
regression with fraction of exports over total sales as dependent variable. The regression includes a constant
term.
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skill-intensity, although the magnitude is smaller than in data. This is because in the model
there are only two tasks, so the model is not so flexible to be able to match this correlation.
Figure 1: Model Results: Export Share and Skill Intensity
Data Model
Source: Mexican Economic Census, 2004. Use of INEGI’s Microdata Processing Laboratory. Sample
limited to non-processing exporters. Firms are sorted by skill intensity and divided in 10 equally-sized
bins. Each bar represents the export share in total sales of firms in that quantile of skill intensity.
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1.5. The Effect of Trade in Demand for Skill
This section uses the estimated model to run a counterfactual experiment of changing trade
costs (τ) while leaving all the other parameters constant. In the benchmark estimation
(τ = 1.2), 84% of total labor is employed in the transportation equipment industry.
The effect of trade on skill premium is illustrated in Figure 2. Skill premium increases when
trade costs decreases when τ is initially high, but it declines with additional fall in costs
after τ is sufficiently low. This result is consistent with the behavior of skill premium in
Mexico following liberalization reforms: an increase after the first wave of reforms between
1987-1994, but a decrease following the enactment of NAFTA in 1994 (Chiquiar (2008);
Robertson (2004)). In the model, the reason for an initially increasing skill premium is that
at high trade costs, the productivity threshold to export is too high, so only those firms
at the very top of the productivity distribution may export. Labor is reallocated to these
exceptional firms that use a large fraction of skilled labor for both tasks, and they perform
both tasks even in the absence of trade. Since these firms grow disproportionately, relative
demand for skilled labor increases. However, additional decreases in trade costs will allow
some lower productivity firms to export. This increases relative demand for unskilled labor
because these firms specialize in the production of the comparative advantage tasks. Thus
the negative effects on relative skilled labor demand dominate and skill premium decreases.
Reallocation occurs both between industries and between tasks within industries. The
left panel of Figure 3 shows that labor is reallocated towards the export-oriented industry
because foreign demand is higher for these goods. Since this industry is more skill-intensive
on average, this result mimics the observation that more skill-intensive industries tend to
have higher export participation. The right panel shows the changes in relative demand of
skilled labor in each industry. The fraction of skilled labor in the export-oriented industry
increases. This is consequence of three mechanisms. First, resources within the industry
are used in the most productive firms which are also the more skill intensive for any given
task. Second, the firms that grow most are the most productive, which coincide with the
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firms that perform the skill intensive task. Third, a larger fraction of firms in the industry
use the skill intensive technology (Figure 4). Because the mass of skilled labor is fixed in
these experiments, the fraction of skilled labor in the domestic-oriented industry decreases.
Figure 4 illustrates the extensive margin of production of the skill-intensive task. At high
τ , a decrease in trade cost does not change the equilibrium fraction of firms performing
the skill intensive task. As trade cost decreases further, lower productivity firms in the
export-oriented industry may become exporters. Having access to an additional market
allows a fraction of these firms to pay the fixed cost of producing the skill-intensive task.
The opposite is true in the domestic oriented industry, where the production of the skill-
intensive task is discouraged as exporters specialize in the comparative advantage task.21
Finally, average productivity in both industries increases with trade liberalization (Figure
5). The mechanisms driving these are consistent with Melitz (2003) because trade induces
creative destruction and forces the least productive firms in an industry to exit. This
decreases the mass of domestic varieties.
Although average productivity in the industry increases, Figure 6 shows that productivity
of the skill-intensive task decreases in the export-oriented industry. This is driven by the
extensive margin of participation in this task, because firms that are relatively unproductive
may select into producing it. Productivity gains of the comparative advantage task are
larger in both industries.
21 In this exercise the mass of firms that perform high skilled task in metal industry is really low, so this
effect may be negligible.
29
Figure 2: Skill Premium
paper/grWagePremium.png
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 3: Skilled Demand Changes Between and Within Industries
Labor in industry
(Fraction of total)
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Skilled labor in industry
(Fraction of labor in industry)
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
The graph in the left (right) plots the fraction of total skilled (unskilled) labor that is employed in the
industry.
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Figure 4: Export and High Skill Task Participation
Transportation equipment
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Metal products
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
The graphs show the fraction of active firms that are exporters and produce the high skill tasks in each
industry.
Figure 5: Domestic Varieties Mass of active firms producing unskilled-intensive task in an
industry
paper/grMassDomestic.png
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
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Figure 6: Weighted average productivity by Task
Transportation equipment
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Metal products
liberalization−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1.6. Conclusion
The model presented allows to study how skill-biased productivity and comparative advan-
tage interact in a relatively skill-scarce country when trade costs decrease. In the model,
factor intensities differ between firms, industries, and tasks, which allows to simultaneously
account for an increase in weighted average productivity, the growth of skill-intensive indus-
tries, and the existence of a negative correlation between export intensity and skill intensity.
As trade costs decrease, the reallocation of labor across industries and tasks translates into
a non-monotonic effect on skill-premium. When trade costs are high, the reallocation of re-
sources within industries towards more productive firms increases relative demand for skill,
but as trade becomes more attractive, the reallocation of resources to unskilled-intensive
tasks dominates.
This paper highlights a contrast between emerging economies, that tend to be unskilled
labor-abundant, and their industrialized counterparts. While comparative advantage mag-
nifies gains from trade in the advantage sector of industrialized countries, productivity gains
are dampened in the skill-intensive tasks of emerging economies. This shows that trade may
induce higher growth of skill-intensive broadly defined industries, while at the same time a
larger expansion of unskilled-intensive tasks within those industries. The results presented
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raise the question of whether trade is weakening incentives for skill accumulation by induc-
ing specialization in the unskilled intensive tasks. This calls for future research on what
effects this may have in the long run.
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Figures
Figure 7: White collar/ Blue collar wage ratio
Source: Own elaboration with data from Monthly Industrial
Survey 1987-2004, BIE-INEGI.
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Figure 8: Fraction of Exporters by Skill Intensity:
3-digit NAICS Industry Average
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of
microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing
Laboratory. Each observation corresponds to the average
in a 4 digit industry. Skill intensity is measured as the
wage bill to non production workers relative to the total
wage bill. “Relative Foreign appeal” refers to the relative
higher foreign demand of the good relative to domestic
demand.
NAICS 3 digit Industry Code
Code Industry name
311 Food
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product
313 Textile Mills
314 Textile Product Mills
315 Apparel
316 Leather and Allied Product
321 Wood Product
322 Paper
323 Printing and Related Support
324 Petroleum and Coal Products
325 Chemical
326 Plastics and Rubber Products
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product
331 Primary Metal
332 Fabricated Metal Product
333 Machinery
334 Computer & Electronic Product
335 Electrical equip& Appliances
336 Transportation Equipment
337 Furniture and Related Product
339 Miscellaneous
Figure 9: Export Participation and Export Intensity by Skill Intensity Bins, 2003
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing
Laboratory. Sample limited to non-processing exporters. Firms are sorted by skill intensity and divided in
10 equally-sized bins. Each bar on the left panel corresponds to the fraction of firms in that decile of
skill-intensity that export. Each bar on the right panel represents the export share of firms in that quantile
of skill intensity. Skill-intensity is measured as the fraction of payments to non-production workers.
35
Figure 10: Export Intensity by Skill-Intensity Bins, 2004
Fraction of workers with high school Average education of workers
Source: ENESTyC 2005. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing Laboratory. Sample
limited to non-processing exporters. Firms are sorted by the skill intensity measure used in each panel and
divided in 10 equally-sized bins. Each bar represents the export share in total sales of firms in that
quantile of skill intensity.
Figure 11: Firm Productivity and Size, 2003
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of microdata
through INEGI’s Microdata Processing Laboratory.
Productivity is measured as value added per worker. Size is
measured by total sales. Each point in the graph on the left
refers to one exporting or non exporting establishment. Each
point in graph on the right refers to the average of exporters or
non-exporters in one 6-digit industry.
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Figure 12: Firm Skill Intensity and Size, 2003
Frac Payments to Non-production Workers Average Total Payments to Labor
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing
Laboratory. Skill Intensity is measured by the fraction of Payments to Non Production Workers. Size is
measured by total sales. Each point in the graphs refers to the average of exporters or non-exporters in one
6-digit industry.
Tables
Table 6: Exporter Premia in Mexican Manufacturing Industry, 2003
Exporter Premia
Log employment 3.90 2.76
Log sales 6.12 4.20 0.63
Log value added per worker 2.03 1.24 0.34
Log average wage 0.72 0.47 0.28
Log capital intensity 1.82 1.19 0.75
Log skill per worker 0.07 0.06 0.37
Log employment control 7 7 3
6 digit industry FE 7 3 3
Source: Mexican Economic Census 2004. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata
Processing Laboratory. The table shows the coefficient of OLS regressions of firm
characteristics on a dummy indicating firm’s exporting status. Regressions in second
column include industry fixed effects and in the third column include industry fixed
effects and log firm employment as controls. Capital intensity refers to capital stock
per worker and skill intensity is the payment to non production workers over total wage
bill. All results are significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 7: Productivity, Export Participation and Export Intensity, 2003
Value added per worker Export participation Export share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value added/ worker 0.038∗ 0.022 -0.005 0.003
(Log) (0.022) (0.023) (0.001) (0.01)
Employment 0.059∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.002
(Log) (0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.030) (0.005) (0.005)
Skill intensity 0.710∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.071) (0.077) (0.03) (0.03)
Capital intensity 0.229∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.005
(Log) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 131,598 131,598 25,687 25,687 2,948 2,948
Industry Fixed Effects No 3 digit No 3 digit No 3 digit
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p<0.1.
Source: Mexican Economic Census, 2004. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing Lab-
oratory. Sample restricted to non-processing firms. All regressions include an unreported constant term.
Columns (1) and (2) show coefficient of an OLS regression of log value added per worker as dependent
variable, Columns (3) and (4) show coefficient of a probit regression of a dummy of exporter as dependent
variable. Columns (5) and (6) show coefficient of OLS regression of exports over total sales as dependent
variable. Skill intensity is measured as the wage bill to non production workers relative to the total wage
bill. Capital intensity is measured as capital stock per worker. All regressions include a dummy indicating
that the firm received foreign capital and one indicating whether it belongs to a corporation as additional
control variables.
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Table 8: Export Share and Skill intensity, 2005
No control All Controls All Controls All Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction wkrs high school education -5.46∗∗ -10.59∗∗∗ -6.85∗ -4.18
(3.14) (3.46) (3.51) (3.50)
Fraction wkrs professional education -16.08∗∗∗ -23.41∗∗∗ -15.96∗∗ -14.48∗∗
(5.34) (6.19) (6.20) (6.16)
Average education of workers -3.96∗∗∗ -6.98∗∗∗ -5.13∗∗∗ -3.54∗∗
(1.24) (1.40) (1.44) (1.45)
Log average wages -3.32∗∗∗ -7.80∗∗∗ -6.08∗∗∗ -5.93∗∗∗
(1.16) (1.60) (1.62) (1.62)
3-digit industry fixed effects 7 7 3 7
4-digit industry fixed effects 7 7 7 3
Source: ENESTyC 2005. Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing Laboratory.∗∗∗ p<0.01,
∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1. Each row in the tables show the coefficient of an independent OLS regression with
export share as dependent variable and each measure of skill as independent variable. Column 1 does not
include any additional control. Columns 2 includes log value added per worker, log employment, log total
sales, log capital stock per worker,a dummy indicating that the establishment receives foreign capital, and
the fraction of foreign capital as additional controls. Columns 3 and 4 include all controls in column 2 plus
3-digit and 4-digit industry fixed effects respectively. Sample restricted to non-processing firms.
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Table 9: Firm Size, 2003
Panel A: Domestic Firms
Dependent variable Log Domestic Sales Log employment
Log VA per worker 0.98∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
Skill intensity 4.19∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗
Additional controls 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 3
Panel B: Exporters
Dependent variable Log Total Sales Log Employment
Log VA per worker 1.00∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Skill intensity 2.06∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.08 0.399∗∗∗ −0.12 −0.17
Additional controls 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 3
Panel C: Exporters
Dependent variable Log Domestic Sales Log Foreign Sales
Log VA per worker 1.05∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
Skill intensity 2.48∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗ −0.9∗∗∗
Additional controls 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 3
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗p <0.05, ∗p<0.1. Source: Mexican Economic Census, 2004.
Use of microdata through INEGI’s Microdata Processing Laboratory. Sample restricted to non-processing
firms. Tables show coefficient in OLS regression. Skill measured as wage bill to non production workers
relative to total wage bill. Additional controls: log capital per worker, indicators of foreign capital
participation and firm belonging to a corporation, and 4 digit NAICS fixed effects.
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APPENDICES
Data Appendix
Mexican Economic Census
The Mexican Economic Census is carried out every five years and it provides information
for all establishments which operated in Mexico during the year previous to the census. The
unit of analysis for the data is an establishment, so all street vendors and economic activities
that do not have a fixed location are excluded. Also excluded are home units that perform
productive activities. The topics covered include date of initiation of activities, foreign cap-
ital participation, total number of days worked, employment, labor compensations, inputs,
expenses, income, fixed assets, inventories, transport equipment, characteristics of physical
capital, and investment. Industries are classified with the Mexican North America Industry
Classification System (NAICS). The manufacturing sample consists on all establishments
in urban locations, industrial parks and corridors, but only a sample of establishments in
rural communities.
I have access to confidential firm level data corresponding to the years 1993, 1998, 2003,
2008, and 2013. In all results I present, I use information for manufacturing activities for
the year 2003, although I obtain the same qualitative results when I do the analysis with
data for other years.
National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology and Training (ENESTyC)
ENESTyC is an industrial survey at the manufacturing establishment level carried out in
1992, 1995, 1999, 2001, and 2005. It covers topics of employment, wages, expenditures,
income, value of production, fixed assets, characteristics of the establishment, data on
organization of the firm, the market, technology and machinery, training, security and
hygiene, and more detailed data on the employment.
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I have access to data from 1992 and 2005. The caveat from this data is that it is not
representative at the 6-digit industry level, but only at the 4-digit. In 1992 the survey
covered 8,733 establishments, and in 2005 9,920. The advantage of this survey is that it
is the only one that includes detailed data about the education and occupation position of
workers.
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Free Entry
This section presents the specification of the model with free entry.
There is an unbounded mass of potential entrants in each sector. To produce in a sector,
firms must pay a sunk fixed entry cost fek > 0. Each entering firm draws a productivity ϕ
from a distribution with density gk(ϕ) and cumulative distribution Gk(ϕ). Selling domes-
tically incurs in fixed costs of fdk > 0 per period, paid using a separate factor of production
whose supply is perfectly elastic. Paying this cost allows the firm to perform task kl using
technology βkl . Selling in the foreign market incurs in fixed costs f
x
k per period, paid using
the separate factor of production. A firm in industry k may additionally pay fixed cost fhk
to perform task kh using technology βkh > βkl . Assume for this part that ϕ
x
k < ϕ
h
k
From the analysis in Section 1.3, profit of unskilled-intensive task (if produce) in each
market is:
pid(βkl , ϕ) =
rd(βkl , ϕ)
σ
− fdk pix(βkl , ϕ) =
rx(βkl , ϕ)
σ
− fxk
Profit of skill-intensive task (if produce) is:
pi(βkh , ϕ) =
rd(βkh , ϕ)
σ
+
rx(βkh , ϕ)
σ
Ixh − f∗k
There is no exogenous exit, so free entry condition is given by:
[
1−G(ϕlk)
]
E[pid(βkl , ϕ)|ϕ > ϕlk] + [1−G(ϕxk)]E[pix(βkl , ϕ)|ϕ > ϕxk]
+ [1−G(ϕ∗k)]E[pid(βkl , ϕ+ pix(βkh , ϕ)Ixh|ϕ > ϕ∗k] = fek
Using the conditions that pid(βkl , ϕ
l
k) = 0, pi
x(βkl , ϕ
x
k) = 0, and pi(βkh , ϕ
∗
k) = 0 the previous
equation can be written as
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
if ϕhk < ϕ
x
k f
d
k
∫
∞
ϕlk
[(
c(βkl
,ϕ)
c(βkl
,ϕl
k
)
)1−σ
− 1
]
∂Gk(ϕ) + f
x
k
∫
∞
ϕxk
[(
c(βkl
,ϕ)
c(βkl
,ϕx
k
)
)1−σ
− 1
]
∂Gk(ϕ)
+f∗k
∫
∞
ϕhk

 c(βkh ,ϕ)
c(βkh
,ϕh
k
)
1+ Dkh∗
τσ−1αkhRP
σ−1
kh
Ix
h


1−σ
− 1
 ∂G(ϕ) = fek
if ϕhk ≥ ϕxk fdk
∫
∞
ϕlk
[(
c(βkl
,ϕ)
c(βkl
,ϕl
k
)
)1−σ
− 1
]
∂Gk(ϕ) + f
x
k
∫
∞
ϕxk
[(
c(βkl
,ϕ)
c(βkl
,ϕx
k
)
)1−σ
− 1
]
∂Gk(ϕ)
+f∗k
∫
∞
ϕhk
[(
c(βkh
,ϕ)
c(βkh
,ϕh
k
)
)1−σ
− 1
]
∂G(ϕ) = fek
(A.1)
An equilibrium with trade consists on a vector:
{pd(βkj , ϕ), px(βkj , ϕ), Pkj , ϕdk, ϕxk, ϕhk ,Mk, wu, ws, R}
. Given D∗kj , τkj and the parameters of the model, the conditions that determine the equi-
librium are, for each task kj , firms’ pricing rules in each market (equations 1.5 and 1.6),
and aggregation of prices (equation 1.17); for each industry k, free entry (equation A.1),
and zero-profit for marginal firm in each market (equations 1.10 and 1.11); for the ag-
gregate economy, labor market clearing (equations 1.15 and 1.16), and consumer’s income
aggregation (equation 1.13).
Productivity gains from trade: To illustrate the effects of trade on productivity I re-
strict to the case where ϕhk ≥ ϕxk. Each of the three terms in equation A.1 are decreasing in
ϕlk, ϕ
x
k, and ϕ
h
k respectively. Opening to trade increases ϕ
l
k in both industries, because ϕ
x
k
decreases with trade costs, so the second term in equation (A.1) increases. If fek doesn’t
change, then decreases in trade costs should increase ϕlk since the first term is decreasing
in the productivity threshold. The increase in the productivity cutoff will increase average
productivity in the industry. However, because relative demand of the unskilled task in-
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creases most, the firms that will grow most are those that have a larger fraction of sales of
the unskilled-intensive task, so not the most productive in the industry.
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